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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -- RIGHT TO COUNSEL - PREMA-
TURE VERDICT RENDERED BEFORE SUMMATION, EVEN IF
STRICKEN, AMOUNTS TO A DENIAL OF RIGHT TO ASSIST-
ANCE OF COUNSEL. Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 463 A.2d 808
(1983).
Defendant was tried and convicted of robbery, burglary, assault,
and theft in a non-jury trial. ' He moved for a judgment of acquittal at
the conclusion of his case. 2 The trial judge denied the motion and im-
mediately announced the guilty verdicts on all counts.3 The defend-
ant's counsel objected to his lack of opportunity to present closing
argument prior to the court's rendering of the verdicts, and moved for a
mistrial.' The judge struck the verdicts, denied the motion, and per-
mitted defense counsel to present his closing argument.' The judge
then adopted all his previous findings and again found the defendant
guilty on all counts.6 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
which affirmed the judgments, characterized the initial denial of the
right to summation as inadvertent and ultimately non-prejudicial.7 In
a close decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and re-
manded for a new trial, holding that a closing argument, made after a
judge has announced the verdict and, even if stricken, is a denial of the
accused's constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
8
1. Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 419, 463 A.2d 808, 809 (1983).
2. Defendant was renewing his previous motion for acquittal that he had made at
the conclusion of the state's case. Id at 418, 463 A.2d at 809.
3. The court recessed for the day after Spence renewed his motion. The following
morning, the judge ruled on the motion and announced the verdicts. Spence was
sentenced to 15 years for burglary, 10 years for robbery, 10 years for assault, and
18 months for theft. Id at 419, 463 A.2d at 809.
4. Id
5. The following colloquy ensued between the judge and defense counsel:
MR. FRIEDMAN [defense counsel]: Your Honor, I'll formally move for
a mistrial at this time.
THE COURT: I'll strike the verdicts. I'll be glad to hear from you sir.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, Your Honor, I don't feel that if I argue the
case at this time that I could possibly convince Your Honor contrary to
what you have already explained. . . . That's like saying go back to the
jury and argue your case now after they have rendered verdicts of guilty.
THE COURT: Mr. Friedman, I'm not a jury and I note that I can be
persuaded by argument and that I'm - if I am persuaded, it wouldn't be
the first time ....
Id at 426-27, 463 A.2d at 814-15. The judge denied counsel's motion for a mis-
trial. Defense counsel continued his objection, but did go forward with his argu-
ment to avoid forfeiting the right to summation. 1d
6. Id at 419, 463 A.2d at 809.
7. Spence v. State, 51 Md. App. 359, 364, 443 A.2d 648, 651 (1982), rev'd, 296 Md.
416, 463 A.2d 808 (1983).
8. Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 423-26, 463 A.2d 808, 812-13 (1983) (4-3 decision).
The court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
influence the verdict. Id at 425, 463 A.2d at 812; see Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967) (establishing beyond a reasonable doubt standard for deeming
harmless errors involving constitutional guarantees).
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The right to make a closing argument9 is a basic element of the
right to the assistance of counsel in criminal trials.'" Closing argument
aids the trier of fact by clarifying the issues for resolution, and gives the
defense a final chance to convince the trier of fact of the defendant's
innocence." Furthermore, it assists the decision-making process by
providing the fact finder with the stimulus of opposing viewpoints.1
2
The usual practice under English common law of allowing a crimi-
nal defendant the opportunity to sum up his case in a closing argu-
ment 13 was subsequently recognized in the United States.' n Until
recently, however, a few jurisdictions forbade summation as a matter of
right in non-jury cases, and instead permitted it within the discretion of
the trial judge. 5 It is now clear that a right to closing argument is
9. The terms "closing argument," "argument," "final argument," and "summation"
are used interchangeably in this note.
10. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975). The sixth amendment pro-
vides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. The sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel applies to state crimi-
nal proceedings through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972) (extending this right to a criminal defendant in a misdemeanor
prosecution). The right to counsel is also incorporated in the due process require-
ment of the fifth amendment. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-68 (1932).
In Maryland, the right to the assistance of counsel is set forth in MD. CONST. art.
21. See also Yopps v. State, 228 Md. 204, 207, 178 A.2d 879, 881 (1962) (recogniz-
ing the right to summation as inherent in the right to counsel). For a general
discussion of the right to counsel, see C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§§ 25.01 to .06 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
11. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975); see J. STEIN, CLOSING ARGU-
MENT §§ 1-11 (1982 & Supp. 1983); 3 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE §§ 521-534 (12th ed. 1975 & Supp. 1983) (general discussion of the law of
closing argument).
12. United States v. King, 650 F.2d 534, 536 (4th Cir. 1981).
13. One legal scholar described the typical English criminal trial in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries as a series of arguments between the defendant and several
counsel for the Crown. See 1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 326 (1883). Procedural reforms in the eighteenth century such as the
right to counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right to call witnesses, shifted
the primary function of argument to summation of the evidence at the close of
trial. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 860-61 (1975). The right of an English
criminal defendant to make a closing argument was codified in the Criminal Pro-
cedure Act of 1865 and is still the law in England. See 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND 295 (4th ed. 1976).
14. See, e.g., Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541, 541-42 (1857) (recognizing right to summa-
tion in jury trial under Indiana Constitution); Olds v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. (3
A.K. Marsh.) 465, 467-68 (1821) (right to summation in non-jury trial under fed-
eral Constitution); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 117 Pa. 378, 381, 11 A. 370, 370
(1887) (right to summation injury trial under Pennsylvania Constitution); Anselin
v. State, 72 Tex. Crim. 17, 18, 160 S.W. 713, 714 (1913) (right to summation in
bench trial under Texas Constitution); Word v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. (3 Leigh)
743, 755-57 (1831) (right to summation in jury trial despite introduction of clear
and unimpeached evidence).
15. See, e.g., People v. Don Carlos, 47 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 863, 866-67, 117 P.2d 748,
750 (1941) (when trial judge decides he is sufficiently informed he may terminate
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inherent in the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel 6 and is
equally applicable whether the case is tried before a jury or judge.'
7
Therefore, intentional denial of closing argument by the trial judge is
clearly reversible error.'8
The right to closing argument is not without qualifications. It re-
mains subject to the wide discretion of the trial judge, who may reason-
ably control its duration' 9 and scope.2" Courts note that a judge must
avoid any display of bias or impatience until completion of the argu-
ment, as this is generally considered equivalent to an actual denial of
summation.2' The defendant may expressly waive his right to closing
argument under California Constitution); People v. Manske, 399 Ill. 176, 178, 77
N.E.2d 164, 170 (1948) (where argument would not significantly aid the trial
court, court may decline to hear it in its discretion); see also State v. Tereau, 304
Minn. 71, 74, 229 N.W.2d 27, 29 (1975) (recognizing right to argument but hold-
ing where evidence against defendant is strong, no prejudicial error in refusing to
hear it).
A New York statute gave the trial judge in a non-jury criminal trial the
power to deny both parties the opportunity to make a summation. N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 320.20(3)(c) (McKinney 1971). This law was found unconstitutional
in 1975. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 864-65 (1975).
16. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857-58 (1975); see also United States v. King,
650 F.2d 534, 536 (4th Cir. 1981) (violation of sixth amendment right to counsel
when trial judge renders guilty verdict before summation and state's argument
will not change the result); Grigsby v. State, 333 So. 2d 891, 892 (Ala. Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 894 (Ala. 1976) (denial of assistance of counsel in
contravention of sixth amendment when trial judge refuses to hear argument).
17. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858-59 (1975) (striking statute vesting
trial judge with discretion to deny closing argument in non-jury trials); see also
United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Pennsylvania, 273 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1967)
(recognizing right to summation as part of due process in non-jury trial); People v.
Thomas, 390 Mich. 93, 210 N.W.2d 776 (1973) (denial of due process and assist-
ance of counsel when verdict rendered by judge before summation); Common-
wealth v. McNair, 208 Pa. Super. 369, 222 A.2d 599 (1966) (terming summation a
critical stage of the proceedings in non-jury trial).
18. See United States v. King, 650 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Walls,
443 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1971). See generally Annot., 38 A.L.R. 2d 1396, 1401-06
(1954) (discussing cases holding trial judge's denial of argument by counsel to be
prejudicial in jury and non-jury cases).
19. See Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 256 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 838
(1963). The time limitation depends on the facts of the particular case, with the
following factors being particularly relevant: (1) the number of witnesses; (2) the
nature and complexity of the issues; and (3) the gravity of the offense involved. J.
STEIN, supra note 11, § 8. See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R. 3d 604 (1966 & Supp.
1983) (discussing propriety of time limitations for summation imposed by courts).
20. Toone v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 98, 161 S.W.2d 90 (1942) (trial court properly
refused to allow argument where proposed argument was beyond the scope of the
issues). For a discussion of the scope of permissible argument, see J. STEIN, supra
note 11, § 12.
21. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Pennsylvania, 273 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa.
1967) (writ of habeas corpus granted to defendant because trial judge interrupted
defense counsel's closing argument and rendered guilty verdict without hearing
the summation); see also People v. Diaz, 1 111. App. 3d 988, 275 N.E.2d 210 (1971)
(trial judge interrupted testimony before argument three times to announce guilty
verdict). But cf. Commonwealth v. Owens, 444 Pa. 521, 281 A.2d 861 (1971)
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argument22 and, in most jurisdictions, the waiver may be implied from
a failure to assert the right at the proper time.23 Thus, the burden usu-
ally rests with the defense counsel to inform timely the court of his
desire to present a final argument.24
Maryland was one of the first jurisdictions to recognize the defend-
ant's constitutional right to present summation in a non-jury trial.25
Consistent with the majority view, this right may be waived in Mary-
land simply by failing to assert it in a timely fashion.26
In Spence v. State, 27 defendant's counsel made an objection to the
court's denial of summation.28 Thus, the issue of first impression
presented to the court of appeals did not involve a waiver of the right,
but rather whether the opportunity to present a summation after a ver-
dict was rendered and then stricken satisfied the defendant's constitu-
tional right to the assistance of counsel.29 Writing for the majority,
Judge Cole held that the striking of the verdict, followed by a reopen-
ing of the record, could not cure the initial error of rendering the ver-
dict before summation.3" The Spence court reasoned that it would be
impossible to recreate the same stage or atmosphere of fairness by al-
(judge not prejudiced even though he was prepared to decide case after ruling on
state's motion for continuance, but before asking for closing arguments).
22. State v. Mann, 361 A.2d 897, 904-05 (Me. 1976).
23. Casterlow v. State, 256 Ind. 214, 267 N.E.2d 552 (1971); State v. Rojewski, 202
Neb. 34, 272 N.W.2d 920 (1979); State v. Weippert, 237 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1975).
24. See People v. Manning, 120 Cal. App. 3d 421, 174 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1981); Coving-
ton v. State, 282 Md. 540, 386 A.2d 336 (1978); cf City of Columbus v. Woodrick,
48 Ohio App. 2d 274, 357 N.E.2d 58 (1976) (requiring an express waiver of closing
argument).
25. See Yopps v. State, 228 Md. 204, 178 A.2d 879 (1962). The right is inherent in the
right to counsel in MD. CONST. art. 21. See also Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853, 859-60 (1975) (discussing Yopps).
26. See Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 386 A.2d 336 (1978). Maryland Rule 522(b),
made applicable to criminal cases through Rule 725(f), generally requires that
counsel object at the time of the court's ruling to preserve appellate review of
reconsideration by the trial court. See also Rome & Modo v. State, 236 Md. 583,
204 A.2d 674 (1964) (untimely announcement of verdict not prejudicial since no
request was made to argue); accord Hewitt v. State, 242 Md. 111, 218 A.2d 19
(1966) (errors of constitutional dimension may be waived in the absence of a
timely objection at trial); cf. Baines v. State, 37 Md. App. 505, 509, 378 A.2d 177,
179 (1977) (no waiver of summation where defense counsel rested case but asked
to be heard).
27. 296 Md. 416, 463 A.2d 808 (1983).
28. Id at 417, 463 A.2d at 808.
29. Dougherty was modified on other grounds in People v. Manning, 120 Cal. App. 3d
421, 174 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1981), which placed a burden on counsel to request argu-
ment to preserve the right to appellate review. Dougherty was ordered deleted
from the California Appellate Reports on direction of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia on August 14, 1981. See 102 Cal. App. 3d 270 (1981). Dougherty's status
as valid California law is now uncertain. But see Spence, 296 Md. at 422 n. 1, 463
A.2d at 811 n. 1 (majority following Dougherty as precedent insofar as the judge's
premature verdict being prejudicial).
30. Spence, 296 Md. at 423, 463 A.2d at 811-12.
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lowing argument after the announcement of a premature verdict. 3'
A strong dissent, authored by Chief Judge Murphy, emphasized
the inadvertency of the denial of summation before verdict and added
that a meaningful opportunity to argue was subsequently afforded to
the defendant.32 The dissent stressed that the verdicts were stricken,
and the judge's good faith willingness to consider the defense counsel's
argument.33 In addition, the dissent viewed defense counsel's objection
as untimely and therefore an implied waiver of the right to summation,
since he waited until the end of an extended series of findings by the
court before objecting.34
The dissenting opinion is both better reasoned and more congru-
ent with existing law. Many of the decisions cited by the majority in-
volved either an intentional denial of summation,35 or a statement by
the trial judge tending to dissuade counsel from presenting summa-
tion.36 Spence though is distinguishable from these cases because the
trial judge in Spence made a good faith effort to correct the procedural
deficiency.37 The majority opinion seemingly adopts a per se rule, re-
quiring a new trial whenever a verdict is announced before the defend-
ant has either made or waived closing argument.38 Such a rigid rule
does not achieve a proper balance between the defendant's right to a
fair trial and the state's interest in promoting judicial economy.
The majority in Spence would not allow the trial court to correct
its error under any circumstances, thereby implying that a judge can
never listen to a post-verdict argument with an open mind.39 On the
contrary, a judge's professional expertise permits a reasonable pre-
31. Id. at 424, 463 A.2d at 812.
32. Id at 432, 463 A.2d at 815 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). Judges Smith and Rodow-
sky joined in the dissenting opinion.
33. Id at 437, 463 A.2d at 818. The trial transcript indicated that the trial judge
listened to the argument, questioned defense counsel on various points, and then
rendered the verdicts. Id at 431, 463 A.2d at 815.
34. Id at 436, 463 A.2d at 817-18.
35. See, e.g., Grigsby v. State, 333 So. 2d 891 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 333 So.
2d 894 (Ala. 1976) (judge rendered guilty verdict and refused defense counsel's
request for argument); Yopps v. State, 228 Md. 204, 178 A.2d 879 (1962) (trial
judge pronounced guilty verdict and refused to allow argument); People v.
Thomas, 390 Mich. 93, 210 N.W.2d 776 (1973) (per curiam) (defense filed a mo-
tion of acquittal; judge did not rule on the motion but found defendant guilty and
declined to hear counsel's argument); Commonwealth v. McNair, 208 Pa. Super.
369, 222 A.2d 599 (1966) (defense requested and was refused the right to
summation).
36. See, e.g., United States v. King, 650 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1981) (magistrate found
defendant guilty and unequivocally stated that defense counsel could present ar-
gument, but that it would not change verdict); United States v. Walls, 443 F.2d
1220 (6th Cir. 1971) (judge reopened record after pronouncement of verdict but
stated that argument would be futile).
37. Spence, 296 Md. at 437, 463 A.2d at 818 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting); see supra note
5 (transcript of the trial judge's actions).
38. Spence, 296 Md. at 426, 463 A.2d at 813 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
39. Id at 437, 463 A.2d at 818.
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sumption that a judge can properly perform his duties in such an in-
stance."a Indeed, the ability of a trial judge to perceive certain
situations differently from a jury composed of laymen was expressly
recognized by the court of appeals in State v. Hutchinson. 4 In Hutchin-
son, the trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact, erroneously admitted a
confession obtained in violation of the Miranda rule.4 2 Upon discover-
ing the error, the judge indicated he would completely disregard the
confession in his pre-verdict deliberation.43 In upholding the guilty
verdict, the court of appeals reasoned that the trial judge's legal train-
ing and unique position in the legal system enabled him to interpret the
nuances of the law and exclude any prejudices from his deliberations."
Therefore, the Spence majority ignores precedent by giving scant defer-
ence to a trial judge's legal professionalism.
The arguments advanced by the Spence dissent find further sup-
port in Commonwealth v. Cooper, 45 a case factually identical to Spence.
In Cooper, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled that a new trial
was not mandated because the denial of summation was unintentional,
the verdict was vacated upon discovery of the error, and the final judg-
ment was free from bias and prejudice.46
As in Cooper, the trial judge's error in Spence was one of miscom-
munication and misunderstanding, not one of intentional unfairness.4 7
The right to a summation in non-jury trials is often not asserted as a
matter of trial strategy." Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the
trial judge to have assumed that Spence waived his right to summa-
tion.49 While the result in Spence could have been avoided if the trial
judge inquired whether counsel desired to present argument, the bur-
40. Id at 437-38, 463 A.2d at 818. The trial judge in Spence indicated that a distinc-
tion exists between a judge and a jury listening to an argument after previously
taking a position. Id at 430, 463 A.2d at 815.
41. 260 Md. 227, 271 A.2d 641 (1970).
42. Id. at 229, 230, 271 A.2d at 642-43. See generaly Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (delineating rights accorded to an arrestee before interrogation or a
voluntary confession).
43. Hutchinson, 260 Md. at 230, 271 A.2d at 643.
44. Id at 233, 271 A.2d at 644.
45. 229 Pa. Super. 52, 323 A.2d 255 (1974).
46. Id at 55, 323 A.2d at 257.
47. Spence, 296 Md. at 437, 463 A.2d at 818 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
48. See Casterlow v. State, 256 Ind. 214, 218, 267 N.E.2d 552, 553 (1971). The right to
summation is frequently waived in non-jury trials because of the simplicity of the
case or the knowledge and experience of the judge. Where argument is made it is
almost always less formal than in a jury case, often in the nature of a discussion
with the court rather than a one-sided argument. Cooper, 229 Pa. Super. at 54-55,
323 A.2d at 257.
49. Moreover, the court recessed after the defense's motion for acquittal and resumed
with the ruling on that motion the following day. Defense counsel, however, did
not request time for argument until after the verdicts were announced. Spence,
296 Md. at 418-19, 463 A.2d at 809. Furthermore, the dissent noted that counsel
ultimately raised the same points in his closing argument that he made in his
initial motion for acquittal. Id at 432, 463 A.2d at 815 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
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den should nevertheless rest on counsel to request time for argument.5 0
By not adopting a case-by-case determination of whether the de-
nial of pre-verdict argument was prejudicial, Maryland appears to have
gone further than any other jurisdiction in safeguarding this right.'
While the impact of Spence remains to be seen, it would now be advis-
able for judges in non-jury trials to obtain sua sponte a waiver of argu-
ment, if counsel's intentions are unclear. Attorneys, however, should
be conscientious and explicitly reserve the right to argument when rest-
ing their case. 2 Although the precise issue in Spence does not arise
with alarming frequency, 53 affirmative steps could easily be taken by
both the bar and the judiciary to ensure that such superfluous litigation
and costly retrials are avoided.
Stuart H Arnovits
50. See People v. Dougherty, 162 Cal. Rptr. 277, 283 (1980) (Brown, J., dissenting)
(deleted from California Appellate Reports on direction of the Supreme Court of
California by order dated August 14, 1981. 102 Cal. App. 3d 270 (1981)).
51. See Spence, 296 Md. at 435, 463 A.2d at 817 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
52. It is not uncommon for trial judges in non-jury cases to assume mistakenly that
the defense counsel does not wish to deliver closing argument. See Grigsby v.
State, 333 So. 2d 891 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 894 (Ala. 1976);
People v. Daniels, 5 I11. App. 3d 545, 366 N.E.2d 1085 (1977); Casterlow v. State,
256 Ind. 214, 267 N.E.2d 552 (1971); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 229 Pa. Super.
52, 323 A.2d 255 (1974). The preferable way to rest one's case and preserve the
right to summation is to simply say, "The defense rests, and I'd like to be heard."
See Baines v. State, 37 Md. App. 505, 507, 378 A.2d 177, 178 (1977).
53. Spence was followed by the court of special appeals in Jones v. State, 55 Md. App.
695, 466 A.2d 55 (1983), which held that a judge who renders a premature verdict
is not qualified to consider the remaining arguments and defendant must be
granted a new trial. The judge, however, did not expressly strike the verdict as in
Spence, nor did he offer assurance that he could be persuaded to reconsider his
finding. See also Myers v. State, 297 Md. 4, 464 A.2d 1067 (1983) (reversing con-
viction and ordering a new trial in light of Spence).
